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search model to explore acceptability of means of payment different from legal
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1 Introduction
One of the distinguishing features of Russia’s transition has been the proliferation of
non-monetary means of payment (NMP) in inter-firm transactions, where NMP refer
to the payment instruments different from legal tender money and bank transfers. In
1992, the share of such operations accounted for about 5 per cent of firm transactions,
increasing to 47 per cent in 1997 (Hendley, 1997), and reaching the levels raging
from 50 to 70 per cent in 1998 (Aukutsionek, 1998; Commander and Mummsen,
1998; Seabright, 2000).
The spread of non-monetary operations was not homogeneous during the pe-
riod. They were relatively rare at the start of the transition, and their biggest increase
occurred in the period when inflation was declining (1995-1997).1 Non-monetary
operations comprised a variety of transaction types among which the main ones were
multilateral barter, offsets,2 and transactions resolved by means of veksels.3
The use of non-monetary means of payment as a stable practice in inter-firm trade
has stimulated a great debate aimed at identifying its main causes and driving forces.
At this moment, competing explanations of this phenomenon can be conventionally
distinguished into those viewing non-monetary operations as a part of the active strat-
egy of firms, and others seeing the firms’ choice of NMP over money to be in some
way induced by economic circumstances.
The main contributions in the first group of explanations include the paradigm
of virtual economy, the price discrimination hypothesis and the tax avoiding strategy.
Gaddy and Ickes (1998, 2002) propose the stylized model in which the Russian econ-
omy is clearly split into real and virtual components. Firms from the real part, mainly
1In Russian Economic Barometer and Aukutsionek (1998), the share of non-monetary settlement
in a sample of medium-sized companies was: 22 per cent in 1995, 25 per cent in 1996, 42 per cent in
1997, and 51 per cent in 1998.
2Multilateral barter consisted in complex chains of deliveries involving many firms and organiza-
tions, often arranged by professional intermediaries. Multilateral offsets consisted in network of rela-
tionship involving the cancellation of mutual debts or the acceptance of goods or services in exchange
for writing off debts or future payments. For detail see Commander and Mummsen (1999).
3OECD (1997), Annex II discusses the development of various money surrogates among which
veksels. Veksels are promissory notes or, if tradable, bills of exchange issued by enterprises, banks or
government with specified maturities and discount rates. In Russia, veksels performed an important
role, serving as the equivalent of debt instruments such as certificates of deposit, commercial paper,
simple IOUs and bonds.
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the natural resources sector, invest in restructuring; while firms from the virtual part,
the old manufacturing sector, invest in the creation of relationship capital, namely
barter chains. This model predicts that NMP with favorable terms of trade will be
used mainly by the manufacturing sector at the expense of the natural resource sec-
tor. However, Guriev and Ickes (1999) do not confirm this prediction and find that
the vast majority of the Russian firms used a mixture of monetary and non-monetary
means of payment. Marin (2002) finds no statistically significant difference in the
pricing behavior across sectors in the use of non-monetary transactions. Guriev and
Kvassov (2004) propose a model in which barter is used to discriminate price and to
take advantage of monopoly power. Using the Russian data, they find the existence of
a significant positive relation between the share of non-monetary transactions in sales
and the market concentration. In a number of studies, non-monetary transactions are
viewed as an instrument to avoid paying taxes (Aukutsionek, 1998, 2001; Hendley et
al., 1997). Carlin et al. (2000), using data from 20 transition economies, report that
there is strong correlation between firms’ overdue tax payments and the use of barter.
Among the explanations which see the firms’ choice to transact without money
as dictated, there is one that considers credit and liquidity crisis to be the primary
reasons of demonetization (Commander and Mummsen, 1999; Brana and Maurel,
1999; Marin, 2002; and Pissarides et al., 2002). Another explanation relies on the
slow payment system in Russia during the transition in which monetary payments
going through banks took up to several months to clear so that barter represented
an alternative way to conduct transactions (Goldman, 1998; Hendley et al., 2000;
Yakovlev, 2000). The proliferation of non-monetary operations is also related to the
state’s reluctance to enforce cash payments for tax and utilities, motivated by the
desire to safeguard higher levels of output and employment (Commander, 1999; and
Pinto et al., 1999).
Taken for given that the causes of demonetization were multiple, this paper is
concerned almost exclusively with addressing the issue of the settlement of trade
relationship in which means of payment are privately created. We believe that this
question is as challenging as the question of causes. The acceptability of legal tender
money as a means of payment is enforced by the state that uses it to buy goods
and services, and accepts it in payment of taxes. The acceptability of a privately-
created means of payment as veksels and debt offsets is based on the willingness
of economic agents to produce and deliver services in their exchange. Given that
in the Russian economy, in the mid 1990s, legal enforcement of private contracts4
and commitment to long-run trade relationships were difficult, if not impossible, and
4see Hendley (1997) for a detailed description of the legal development in Russia.
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the industrial organization was such that the vast majority of goods were produced
through chains in which supplying companies never needed what their customers
were producing,5 it is important to identify the minimal set of mechanisms through
which firms promoted the acceptability and, consequently, value of privately created
means of payment. In this sense, this study contributes to better understanding of the
demonetization process in which the hysteresis effect was important.6
We propose a simple search model to explore the acceptability of means of pay-
ment. For the purpose of this study, the terms means of payment and means of ex-
change are used interchangeably. The basic framework of the model is that of the
standard search model of money.7 The paper starts with the re-elaboration of one
of Rupert et al. (2000) models where the acceptability of means payment is based
on the expectations of agents about the quantity of other agents willing to produce
for it, which suggests that this economy may have multiple equilibria: barter, partial
and general use of means of payment. We, however, illustrate that the acceptability
has a self-enforcing nature, that is, once a part of agents start to accept some ob-
ject (fiat money) as a means of payment, the monetization through it is likely to be
self-fulfilling.
The second section shows that the acceptability of means of payment is not its
own property, but a property it has in a particular equilibrium. It, however, does not
imply that the intrinsic properties of objects or securities to be used as a means of
payment are not important. In the third section, we study the case of commodity
money. What makes some goods more likely become a means of payment is their
saleability, defined as the number of productions to which these goods are input.8
We find that different equilibria are possible including full and partial monetization
5see Blanchard and Kramer (1997) for a detailed description of sophisticated chains of production
in the Russian economy at the beginning of the transition process.
6Commander and Mummsen (1999) suggest that the initial causes which pushed enterprises to
choose non-monetary means of payment might be different from the causes which subsequently de-
termined the situation in which non-monetary means of payment crowded out money.
7Among the assumptions of standard search models of money we find difficulty in overcoming a
double coincidence of preferences. Gurieve and Ickes (1999) estimate the incidence of the double-
coincidence-of-wants problem on barter in Russia. Assuming that the more inputs an enterprise needs,
the more searches the enterprise would have to undertake when it chooses to sell for barter, they find
that enterprises with a greater complexity of production did not barter less. However, it needs to be
pointed that the operations, which were commonly referred to as barter, in reality involved transactions
in which goods were traded for goods, and not necessarily transactions based on the double coincidence
of preferences.
8In Jones (1976), the high level of desirability of some commodities, defined as the quantity of
agents demanding them for consumption, is determinant for using them as a means of exchange to
complete indirect transactions.
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through commodity money.
Finally, in the fourth section, we explore the enforcement of trade arrangement
in which agents agree to produce on credit. We use it as a proxy of multilateral
barter and offset schemes which were largely used by the Russian firms during the
mid 1990s. We show one way in which economic agents can implement multilateral
trade arrangement, in the absence of any third party enforcement authority, in which
everyone agrees to produce on credit. The private enforcement mechanism relies on
the knowledge of agents’ reputations in the group as a whole.
2 Means of Payment
Among the functions of money, its role as a general means of exchange is arguably the
most important one. A means of exchange is defined as an object which is ′habitually,
and without hesitation, taken by anybody in exchange for any commodity.′9 A related
notion is a means of payment which is defined as an object that can be used to pay for
any purchase and settle any debt. Though there could exist conditions under which
the two concepts differ, for the purposes of this study we ignore them and use the two
terms means of payment and means of exchange interchangeably.
In this section we study the acceptability of fiat money as a means of payment.
In search models, fiat money is an object that circulates in the market and has two
characteristics emphasized by Wallace (1980). It is intrinsically useless, and it is not
backed by any government policy. These characteristics, which are used in search
models ′to account for the additional value that money has over and beyond its in-
trinsic value and government intervention, ′10 are the same which render fiat money
very different from what is used in real economies as outside money - legal tender.
Given the above definition of fiat money, we feel we can use it as a proxy of a generic
means of payment whose acceptability in the economy arises through the network of
social interactions.
2.1 Physical Environment
Consider an economy in which there is a continuum of types of goods and agents
whose quantities are normalized to 1. Time is discrete. Agents live infinitely. They
discount future at common rate r > 0. Each agent can consume only those goods
which belong to his consumption range of the size equal to the fraction x ∈ (0, 12) of
9Wicksell [1906] 1967, p.17.
10Shi, S. (2006), p.644.
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all goods. And each agent can produce only one good which can be consumed by
the fraction x of all agents. Nobody produces for his own consumption needs, and
everyone must trade.
In addition to the goods, there is another object in this economy, called fiat money.
Its total supply is fixed at M, whereas M ∈ (0,1). At the beginning of time t = 1,
money is distributed randomly in the population so that the fraction M of agents
hold a unit of it, and the fraction 1−M agents have no endowment but are ready to
produce. Fiat money and goods are indivisible. Given these assumptions, each trade
is always a swap of two indivisible objects: money for good in monetary trade, and
good for goods in barter trade.
The utility of consumption of the good that belongs to the agent’s consumption
range isU > 0, the utility of consumption of the good different from the consumption
goods is 0. Each agent can produce a fixed quantity of his production good at cost c.
The only input to production is previous consumption. Production is instantaneous
to consumption.
To describe the exchange process, we call agents with money buyers, and those
agents who do not have money, but are ready to produce, producers. In exchange,
buyers and producers meet randomly and bilaterally. During a period, each agent has
the probability of being matched once with other agent with his consumption good.
The trading histories are private information. Given these assumptions, agents can
not commit themselves to any kind of credit arrangement.
Because money is useless, each buyer is always willing to exchange it for his
consumption good. It occurs with the probability (1−M)x, that is, the probability of
meeting a producer 1−M with one of the buyer’s consumption goods x. To exclude
the possibility that some goods can be used in exchange as a commodity money, we
assume that all goods are non storable, and hence need to be produced and consumed
at the same time.
Each producer always produces in meetings with a double coincidence of prefer-
ences, which are the meetings in which two producers meet and each one can produce
what the other wants. Their probability is (1−M)x2, that is, the probability of meet-
ing a producer 1−M, times the probability of double coincidence of preferences x2.
The non-trivial decision of the producer is whether to trade for fiat money. Obviously,
this decision depends on the willingness of other agents to do the same.
We assume that each agent, before entering exchange, decides his trade strategy
on the basis of his individual estimation about the quantity of other agents in this
economy willing to produce for money. Since all agents are symmetric, the individual
estimations are the same across economy, and equal to p.
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2.2 Trade Strategies
In order to find out the conditions under which agents decide to trade for fiat money,
it is convenient to use Bellman’s equations. We consider the stationary economy in
which the value functions of buyers and producers are constant over time.
The value function of holding a unit of money is
Vb =
1
1+ r
x(1−M)p(U+Vp)+ 11+ r (1− x(1−M)p)Vb. (2.1)
Each buyer is always willing to trade his money for a consumption good, but he can
do it only if he meets the producer who can provide him with his consumption good,
and who agrees to accept money. These three events occur with the probabilities (1−
M), x, and p respectively, so that the total probability of consumption is (1−M)xp.
By consuming, the buyer enjoys the utility U , after which he switches to being a
producer whose value isVp. If a trade fails to occur, the buyer holds his money which
has the value Vb.
After rearranging (2.1), we arrive at the following equation of the buyer’s value
function
rVb = (1−M)xp(U+Vp−Vb). (2.2)
The value of being a producer is
Vp =
1
1+ r
xMp(−c+Vb)+ 11+ r (1−M)x
2(U− c+Vp)
+
1
1+ r
(1−Mxp− (1−M)x2)Vp (2.3)
Each producer during a period of time can either barter or trade his production good
for fiat money. The net gain from trades in barter meetings isU−c+Vp−Vp=U−c,
times their probability (1−M)x2. The net gain that a producer has in trades with fiat
money is Vb− c−Vp, times their probability Mx, times the producer’s expectation of
the acceptability of fiat money p.
Rearranging the producer’s value function in (2.3), we arrive at
rVp =Mxp(Vb− c−Vp)+(1−M)x2(U− c). (2.4)
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2.3 Acceptability of Fiat Money
We seek equilibria in trading strategies, in which each agent chooses whether to trade
or not in order to maximize his expected discounted utility of consumption net of
cost of production, taking the trading strategies of other agents as given. We focus on
steady-state symmetric equilibria.
The decision of each agent to trade for fiat money is based on the values of p, Vp,
andVb. All agents being symmetric, the strategy of a buyer is the same for all buyers,
and the strategy of a producer is the same for all producers. In order to find out the
conditions under which fiat money is used as a means of payment, we define the net
gains of buyers and producers from trades with it. The net gain of buyers is
∆b =U+Vp−Vb. (2.5)
Similarly, the net gain of producers is
∆p =Vb− c−Vp. (2.6)
Substituting (2.2) and (2.4) in the equations of net gains, and doing some rear-
ranging, we arrive at the following equations of net gains
∆b =
(U− c)x(Mp+ x(1−M))+ rU
r+ xp
(2.7)
∆p =
(U− c)(1−M)x(p− x)− rc
r+ xp
. (2.8)
It is straightforward from (2.7) that the net gain of buyers is positive for all pa-
rameter values. This result confirms the assumption that buyers are always willing to
spend fiat money to buy their consumption goods. On the other hand, the net gain of
producers in (2.8) can be either positive or negative. As a result, the acceptability of
fiat money as a means of payment in this economy depends on the sign of net gain of
producers.
We define that for those values of p ∈ [0,1] for which ∆p < 0, the common strat-
egy of producers is to produce only in meetings with barter. For those values of
p ∈ [0,1] for which ∆p ≥ 0, the common strategy of producers, in addition to produc-
ing in meetings with barter, is to provide goods in exchange for fiat money.
Proposition 1. For any M ∈ (0,1) and x ∈ (0,1), there exist three potential equilib-
ria:
(a) p ∈ [0,x] is always a barter equilibrium
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(b) p= 1 is a monetary equilibrium if c≤ xU(1−M)(1−x)r+x(1−M)(1−x)
(c) if agents produce at cost c < xU(1−M)(1−x)r+x(1−M)(1−x) , then some p ∈ (x,1) can be an
equilibrium as well.
Proof. It is straightforward from (2.8) that for any p ∈ [0,x], ∆p < 0 and the only
possible equilibrium is barter exchange. Nobody produces for money which is not
accepted by others or accepted by the fraction of agents which is less than the fraction
of agents accepting each agent’s production goods x. Consider p= 1. For this to be an
equilibrium, we require ∆p≥ 0. Inserting pi = 1 into (2.8) and resolving it for the cost
of production, we find that ∆p ≥ 0 if c≤ xU(1−M)(1−x)r+x(1−M)(1−x) , as stated in Proposition 1. If
agents produce at cost c< xU(1−M)(1−x)r+x(1−M)(1−x) , then some x< p< 1 can be an equilibrium
as well.
As we see, given the values of x ∈ (0, 12) and M∈ (0,1), there exists a positive
relation between the number of agents accepting fiat money p, their cost of produc-
tion c and the discount rate r.11 Thus, taken for given the number of agents accepting
money in this economy p> 0, for fiat money to become a generally accepted means
of payment, either agents should produce at a relatively small cost or they must be
sufficiently patient. This result is driven by the fact that in production for money,
agents anticipate the disutility cost with respect to consumption which will occur in
future and which agents discount at a positive rate r.
2.4 Extension
We have arrived at the monetary equilibrium solution (p,c) considering symmetric
agents. The main reason why agents feel it necessary to use fiat money as a means
of payment is the requirement of a double coincidence of preferences in trades with
barter. But what might be the reason that some p agents more readily produce in
exchange for fiat money, while others decide to do it, only after taking as given the
positive decision of the former ones? To answer to this question, we consider an econ-
omy in which agents differ by their costs of production. That is, everyone produces
at some cost c ∈ (0,U), and the information about the production costs of agents is
public knowledge so that everyone at any moment in time knows how many agents
in this economy produce at the cost which is less than, equal to, or higher than his.
11The conditions for existence of monetary equilibrium similar to those in Proposition 1 can be
determined in terms of discount rate.
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Keeping all other things unchanged, we seek the conditions under which money
can be used as a means of payment in this economy. Buyers are always willing
to spend their money to buy consumption goods, the interesting decision is that of
producers to provide goods in exchange for fiat money. To find out the conditions
under which money can be accepted in payment for goods, we consider the producer’s
i net gain in trade with fiat money
∆p,i =
(U− ci)(1−M)x(pi− x)− rci
r+ xpi
(2.9)
where ci is the agent’s i cost of production, and pi is the number of other agents
producing at costs less than or equal to ci.
We define that for those values of pi ∈ (x,1] for which ∆p,i≥ 0, the agent i decides
to produce in exchange for fiat money, otherwise he only trades in meetings with
barter. Resolving (2.9) for pi, we obtain that if the fraction of other agents producing
at costs less than or equal to ci is pi ≥ pˆ, whereas
p̂= x+
rci
x(U− ci)(1−M) (2.10)
is the critical value for which ∆p,i = 0, the producer i will find it individually optimal
to produce in exchange for fiat money.
Suppose that the condition in (2.10) could be satisfied for some fraction P1 of
agents, each of whom produce cost c ∈ (0,C1], and not for others, then barter and
monetary trade can coexist. However, fiat money, if used at all, can be used much
more widely than is apparent from (2.10), and the most efficient agents will promote
its acceptability.
From Figure 1, we see that given that individual costs of production of P1 agents
are less than or equal toC1, each of them will find it individually optimal to produce if
the quantity of other agents, producing at sufficiently low cost, is at least equal to p1,
whereas p1 is the solution to 2.10. Suppose that P1 > p1, then some other n agents,
whose cost of production is greater than C1, will find it beneficial to produce for fiat
money as well, increasing its acceptability from P1 to P2 = P1 + n. An increase in
the acceptability of fiat money will allow some other less efficient agents to produce
in exchange for fiat money as well, further increasing the demand for fiat money for
transaction needs. If agents in this economy produce all at costs c≤C′ , whereasC′ =
xU(1−M)(1−x)
r+x(1−M)(1−x) (see Proposition 1), then this self-reinforcing process of acceptability
can take this economy very close to full monetization through fiat money.
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Figure 1
3 Commodity Money
The above section illustrates one way in which the use of a means of payment and its
acceptability can be determined endogenously in the model. We see that the accept-
ability of fiat money is not its own property, but, instead, depends on which equilib-
rium occurs. However, this does not mean that the intrinsic properties of objects are
not important. We have come to the above result by ruling out the possibility of a rise
of commodity money. In particular, we have assumed that all goods are not storable,
and have to be consumed and produced at the same time so that the only alternative
to barter in this economy is to use fiat money. In this section, we relax the above
assumption to study the case of commodity money, defined as an object which, in
addition to its value as a means of payment, can be used as a consumption good or a
productive input, at least potentially.
The main aim of the analysis in this section is to explore the acceptability of
commodity veksels which were largely used to settle inter-firm trade relationships
in Russia. These securities represented short term inter-firm debt obligations extin-
guished with provision of commodities. Their number in Russia grew continuously
starting in 1995 when, in the situation of sever monetary tightness, firms faced with
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the progressive accumulation of arrears,12 resorted to in-kind payments. Supply-
ing companies started to accept productions of their customers in payment of their
goods. If they could not use them directly, they could exchange them sooner or later
for something they needed. In this situation, every supplier had a strong incentive
to assist his customers in selling their goods for something he would accept more
promptly in payment. As a result, firms were progressively involved in a kind of non-
explicit cooperation whose main aim was to explore chains of in-kind trade. In this
process, goods, which were input to the largest number of other productions, were
more promptly accepted for transaction. Among the most ′liquid′ goods there were
productions of natural monopolies as Gasprom (gas monopoly), RAO UES (electric-
ity monopoly), and railways. Not by chance, the operation of these companies in
the period from 1995 to 1998 become severely demonetized.13 Obviously, for the
transaction scope, it was not goods that changed hands but respective veksels.14
Commodity veksles played the role of commodity money. To account for the
acceptability and value that they have had above and beyond the intrinsic qualities of
the underlying goods, we propose a simple model in which their general acceptability
depends on the equilibrium that occurs.
3.1 Acceptability of Commodity Money
For the simplicity of treatment, consider an economy in which there is no exogenous
object which can be used as a means of payment. All agents produce at the same
cost c, but differ by demand for their production goods, that is, there is the fraction
M ∈ (0,1) of agents each of whom produces a good consumed by the fraction y of
other agents. We call such agents issuers. The remaining 1−M agents produce
goods which can be consumed by the fraction x of other agents. We assume that x<
y< 1−M. Neither agent can produce for his consumption need, and everyone must
trade.
12In the period between 1994 and the middle 1998, in Russia the share of overdue payables increased
from around 40 to 55 percent of total payables.
13In Pinto et al. (2000), cash collections were as low as 12-13 per cent on domestic sales for Gazprom
and RAO UES, and about 30 per cent for the railways.
14Commodity veksels are not exactly commodity money. According to the definition, the value of
commodity money comes from a commodity out of which it is made, and, consequently, it is imme-
diately perceivable by its customers. Commodity veksels are not made of commodities but can be
exchanged for them. As a result, their value is not perceived directly. However, for the purpose of this
study, we think that this difference can be ignored and commodity veksels can be considered at par with
commodity money because we focus on studying veksels representing commodities used as inputs to a
large number of productions so that firms can have sufficient knowledge about their value.
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Keeping all other things unchanged, we define the value function of issuer as
rVI =Mxy(U− c)+(1−M)xy(U− c) = xy(U− c). (3.1)
During a period, each issuer may either meet with the probability M another issuer,
or he may meet with the probability 1−M an ordinary agent. The probability of the
double coincidence of preferences in both cases is xy, which is equal to the probability
that the issuer can consume the good that other agent produces x and vice versa y.
The value function of ordinary agents is defined as follows
rVo =Mx2(U− c)+(1−M)x2(U− c) = x2(U− c). (3.2)
During a period, each ordinary agent may meet with the probability M an issuer, or
he may meet with the probability 1−M another ordinary agent. In both cases the
probability of the double coincidence of preferences is x2.
Because the value function of issuers is bigger than the value function of ordinary
agents, the latter can decide to accept goods of issuers even if they can not consume
them. By doing so, each ordinary agent will increase his probability of consumption
in the next period from x2 to xy. Yet, by doing so, each ordinary agent will have to
anticipate the disutility of production c with respect to the moment of consumption.
Thus, the net gain that the ordinary agent will have in trade with transaction goods,
which are the goods that he can not consume but can use to buy consumption in
future, is
∆O =−c+ xyUr −
x2(U− c)
r
(3.3)
equal to the payoff from accepting the trade −c+ xyUr , minus the payoff from reject-
ing it x
2(U−c)
r .
Issuers seem to have no incentive to produce in exchange for transaction goods,
because each of them already produces a good which has the highest demand in this
economy. In fact, their net gain from producing in exchange for transaction goods is
∆I =−c+ xyUr −
xy(U− c)
r
(3.4)
which is negative for all parameter values. Nevertheless, there exists a possibility to
further increase the value of issuers by making transaction goods be a general means
of payment. If ordinary agents find it beneficial to produce in exchange for transac-
tion goods, the acceptability of each of them will increase from y to Ω=1−M+yM,
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that is, each transaction good will be accepted by all ordinary agents 1−M, and by
issuers who can consume it yM. At this point, issuers can decide to produce in ex-
change for transaction goods as well. By doing so, they will increase the probability
of trade from Ω = 1−M+ yM to 1, yet, they will have to anticipate the produc-
tion cost c with respect to the moment of consumption. Thus, taken as given the
acceptability of transaction goods by ordinary agents Ω = 1−M+ yM, the net gain
of issuers in meetings where they produce in exchange for transaction goods is
∆
′
I =−c+
xU
r
− xΩ(U− c)
r
(3.5)
3.2 Trading Strategies
Each agent will choose whether or not to produce in exchange for transaction goods
in order to maximize his expected discounted utility of consumption net of cost of
production, taking the trading strategies of other agents as given. That is, each agent
will produce in exchange for transaction goods if his net gain from this trade is ∆ j ≥ 0
where j = I,O.
Proposition 2. In the model, for any x ∈ (0, 12), M∈ (0, 1), y ∈ (x,1−M) and r > 0,
there are three potential types of equilibria:
(a) Ω= 1 is an equilibrium if c≤ ĉ1 ≤ ĉ2 or c≤ ĉ2 ≤ ĉ1
(b) Ω= 1−M− yM is an equilibrium if ĉ2 < c≤ ĉ1
(c) Ω=y is an equilibrium if c> ĉ1
where the critical values of c are given by
cˆ1 =
xU(y− x)
r− x2
ĉ2 =
xUM(1− y)
r− x(1−M+ yM)
Proof. To find out the fist critical value ĉ1, we resolve the net gain of ordinary agents
(3.3) for the cost production. Similarly, we resolve (3.5) to find out the second critical
value ĉ2. If all agents produce at cost c > ĉ1, then no one in this economy will find
it individually optimal to produce in exchange for goods that he can not consume.
If agents produce at cost ĉ2 < c ≤ ĉ1, then only ordinary agents will use transaction
goods as a means of payment. If agents produce at cost c ≤ ĉ1 ≤ ĉ2 or c ≤ ĉ2 ≤ ĉ1,
then the transaction goods will be used as commodity money.
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4 Offsets
Multilateral barter and multilateral offsets have been very important numerically in
non-monetary inter-firm operations in Russia. The difference between them is subtle,
both worked as a network of non-monetary operations, but multilateral barter was
′primarily a working capital related transaction while offsets [were] a mechanism for
settling mutual debts.′15 Offsets, in addition to being frequent in inter-firm trade, were
largely used to clear tax obligations between firms and tax authorities. In this work,
we focus exclusively on offsets involving firms, and do not get into the undoubtedly
important issue of tax offsets because the latter served scopes which were different
from transaction needs.16
In this section we illustrate one way in which agents can implement a trade ar-
rangement in which everyone agrees to produce on credit. The challenging issue
of this analysis is to show how agents can promote the trust necessary for the im-
plementation of this trade arrangement when each of them has a short run incentive
to deviate from it. There exists rich economic literature whose common idea can
be illustrated saying that if trade relationship itself is valuable to an agent and he
could lose it by deviating behavior, then he would be unwilling to surrender it unless
the gain from deviating is sufficiently large to compensate him.17 The private en-
forcement mechanism - reputation - relies essentially upon the value of the repeated
or long-term trade relationship between economic agents and their customers. We,
however, are interested in seeing if the mechanism of good reputations can work in
trade relationship in which the parts are not so sure they will trade again in the future.
Milgrom et al. (1990) show that even in a community in which any particular pair
of individuals meet rarely, it is possible for an individual’s reputation in the group
as a whole to serve as a bond for his good behavior toward each individual member.
We follow this idea, and consider a trade arrangement in which each agent’s credit,
known to the group through the reputation mechanism, substitutes for money, that is,
every economic agent agrees to produce only for those who have done the same in
the past.18
15Pinto et al. (2000), p.298
16for a detailed discussion on tax offsets see Pinto et al. (2000).
17see Klein and Leffler (1981); Shapiro (1983); Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984); Abreu (1988); Aumann
(1985); Fudenberg and Maskin (1986).
18In Cavalcanti and Wallace (1999) there is the assumption that a subset of agents is not anonymous;
agents in this subset can be monitored or can have reputations.
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4.1 Cooperative Agreement
Consider an economy in which all agents are symmetric. Everyone produces at the
same cost c one production good which can be consumed by the fraction x of other
agents. Keeping all other things unchanged, consider a trade arrangement in which
each agent, in addition to producing in barter meetings, agrees to produce for other
agents who like what he produces but not vice versa - a meeting with a single coinci-
dence of preferences. This trade arrangement, in which agents get involved in a kind
of non-explicit cooperation, generates the maximum possible value
Vc =
1
1+ r
x2(U− c+Vc)+ 11+ r x(1− x)(U+Vc)+
1
1+ r
x(1− x)(−c+Vc)
+
1
1+ r
(1− x2−2x(1− x))Vc. (4.1)
which is equal to the payoff from trade in a barter meeting U − c+Vc, times its
probability x2; plus the payoff from trade in a meeting with a single coincidence of
preferences in which the agent consumes U +Vc, times its probability x(1− x); plus
the payoff from trade in a meeting with a single coincidence of preferences in which
the agent has to produce −c+Vc, times its probability x(1− x); plus the payoff from
non trading during a period Vc, times its probability 1− x2−2x(1− x).
Rearranging (4.1), we arrive at the following equation
rVc = x2(U− c)+ x(1− x)(U− c) = x(U− c). (4.2)
The value of cooperation is bigger than the value of barter rVb = x2(U−c), yet, since
agents can not commit ex ante to implement it, to make it work, we need to consider
the ex-post incentive condition. To get agents to produce in meetings with a single
coincidence of preferences, we require that their net gains are
∆c =−c+Vc−VD ≥ 0 (4.3)
whereas VD is the deviation payoff. We consider the case in which agents decide
to punish deviators, who are the agent rejecting to produce in single coincidence
meetings, by allowing them in the future only to trade in meetings with barter. We can
think about an alternative punishment measure - autarky - but its application would
require sustaining an additional cost because trade in barter meetings is mutually
beneficial and, consequently, it is self-enforcing. If the deviation payoff is equal to
the payoff from barter VB, the above ex-post incentive condition becomes as follows
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∆c =−c+Vc−VB ≥ 0. (4.4)
If agents can observe what happens only in their own meetings but not in others,
then, if an agent deviates, the probability that someone he meets later will know it
is 0. As a result, agents as a group can not trigger punishment measures against
deviators, and the incentive condition in (4.4) reduces to
∆c =−c+Vc−Vc < 0. (4.5)
Since it is negative for all parameter values, we conclude that if agents can not ob-
serve the trade histories of others, nobody in this economy will find it optimal to
produce in meetings with a single coincidence of preferences regardless to the fact
that the value of cooperation is, ex-ante, bigger than the value of barter.
If, instead, trade histories are observed perfectly so that agents always know what
happens in their own and other meetings, then the net gain of producers in meetings
with a single coincidence of preferences is
∆c =−c+Vc−VB
or
∆c =−c+ x(U− c)r −
x2(U− c)
r
. (4.6)
Solving it for the cost of production, we find that if agents produce at cost c ≤ c,
whereas
c=
Ux(1− x)
r+ x(1− x) (4.7)
is the critical level for which ∆c = 0, the ex-post incentive condition in (4.4) is satis-
fied and agents can implement the trade arrangement in which each agent, in addition
to producing in barter meetings, agrees to produce on credit.19
19If (4.4) is satisfied, one can interpret the trade arrangement in this section as a credit system in which
there is no need for money. A fundamental result of Kocherlakota (1998) is that money is not essential
in the sense that the same allocations feasible with money can be enforced if money is substituted with
a record-keeping instrument.
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4.2 Enforcement of Cooperation
Situations in which agents observe trade histories perfectly or they do not observe
them at all might not be appropriate to describe reality. Thus, we consider another
possibility, that is, agents know what happens in the trade meetings of others with
some probability Φ ∈ (0,1) and the mechanism through which it becomes possible is
private reputation.
When two agents meet, each of them learns at no cost the trade histories of his
partner and of partners of his partner. Obviously, deviating agents have no incentive
to tell the truth about their trade histories. On the other hand, agents, whom trade was
rejected, have a strong incentive to make this information known to others. Since we
seek a steady-state equilibria in trading strategies, we assume that the probability
with which each agent knows the trade reputation of the agent he meets Φ remains
constant in time.
Consider the trade arrangement with cooperation outlined in the above sub-section
in the situation in which trade histories are observed with probability Φ. Trade in
meetings with barter is self-enforcing and does not depend on reputations. Trade in
meetings with a single coincidence of preferences is processed only if a producer
knows about the good reputation of his counterpart, that is, if producer knows that
the agent, who wants his production good, has produced for others in meetings with
a single coincidence of preferences in the past. Given this, the ex-post incentive
condition in (4.4) becomes as follows
∆
′
c =−c+ΦVc−VB ≥ 0 (4.8)
or
∆
′
c =−c+
Φx(U− c)
r
− x
2(U− c)
r
(4.9)
It results from (4.9) that in a specialized economy in which x is sufficiently low,
agents, to enforce cooperation, must be able to communicate a great number of rep-
utations, that is the probability with which each agent knows the trade reputations
of the agent he meets must be Φ > 1− x. In addition, they should produce at cost
c< c
′
< c, whereas
c
′
=
xU(Φ− x)
r+ x(Φ− x) (4.10)
is the critical value for which ∆′c = 0, otherwise the only possible trade is barter.
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5 Comments and conclusions
The demonetization in Russia has been peculiar and distinct from what happened
in other transition countries, where stabilization policies had as a result increases in
payment arrears and trade credit, but did not produce situations in which legal tender
money was laterally crowded out by ′surrogate′ money. One possible explanation for
the peculiarity of the Russian case (and of some other countries of the former Soviet
Union) is the possibility of the existence of multiple equilibria, that is, for the same
exogenous setting there may be equilibria either with non-monetary transacting or
without it so that the hysteresis effect is to determine which equilibrium the economy
will converge to in the end. In 1995, a liquidity shock threw the Russian economy
into the trap of non-monetary transacting20 in which it remains for the following four
years.
In this paper, we propose a model to formalize the above idea. In the model the
acceptability of means of payment - fiat money, commodity money, and trade credit
- depends on the equilibrium that occurs. Furthermore, we formalize the so-called
hysteresis effect by illustrating how, once a mechanism of non-monetary transacting
is established by promoting the acceptability of a generic means of payment among
the minimum sufficient number of economic agents, its further proliferation is likely
to be self-fulfilling. This argument predicts that even after the initial causes which
propel non-monetary transacting are removed, the system will tend to persist.
Our model is highly stylized, and as such omits many important driving elements
in the demonetiziation process, however it clearly illustrates the idea of how eco-
nomic agents can promote non-monetary transacting in the situation of severe mon-
etary tightness. In addition, it needs to be pointed out that the results outlined in the
above sections have been obtained in a very specific context. Given the indivisibility
assumption, agents are compelled to trade at given price and, since there is no legal
tender money in the model, they chose a trading strategy departing from the situation
of pure barter. Further research, relaxing these restrictions, can shed more light on
the mechanisms of non-monetary transacting.
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